The 2 2 Matrix Games with Cardinal Payo¤s
In the folklore and elementary education of game theory the 2 2 matrix game has played a special role. Several of these games bear special names such as The Prisoner's Dilemma, The Stag Hunt, and the Battle of the Sexes. There are only 144 strategically di¤erent 2 2 games with strictly ordinal preferences. We are often interested in considering related games with cardinal preferences and a moment's consideration shows that there is an inde…nite number of these games. Many applications make it desirable to examine a large but …nite set of 2 2 games with speci…c numbers of highly di¤erent sizes. In a di¤erent paper we suggest how to do this [4] . This paper utilizes all the 144 games listed in Appendix 2 as they serve to give a su¢ ciently exhaustive coverage of all 2 2 games to be able to get a feeling for the e¢ ciency of noncooperative and some other behaviors without delving into a more re…ned apparatus as we do in [11] .
Outcome Sets
The 2 2 matrix game with strictly ordinal payo¤s may be cardinalized by 4 > 3 > 2 > 1 . We may study the strictly ordinal set of games utilizing just the symbols 1; 2; 3; 4 1 . Two of the top desirable properties of a good society are e¢ ciency and fairness, they can only be de…ned after the assumptions concerning preferences have been made.
Fairness and e¢ ciency
Fairness cannot be de…ned before the initial conditions are spelled out. The full speci…cation of initial conditions requires the assumptions made about innate property rights of individuals. Symmetry involves the consideration of intrinsic property rights. These are discussed elsewhere [3] , [6] , [1] , [5] ,. Here we concentrate only on e¢ ciency,which amounts to considering how close actual outcomes are to a jointly maximal payo¤.
Behavior and Structure
We consider and contrast several other behaviors beyond noncooperative behavior. Metaphorically we consider four player types described as: The individualist; the pessimist; the optimist or idealist; and the know-nothing, zero-intelligence or fool or entropic player.
The Entropic Player : The Entropic player is the player that always acts or chooses a strategy uniformly at random 2 . MaxMax(P 1 +P 2 ): The MaxMax Player is the player who always chooses the strategy for which the maximum social welfare is achieved. Call her MaxMax or the Utopian Player. she acts as if she will do the right thing and knows the other will do so 3 . The player makes one simple inference about what the the other player will do.
Max s Min s P 1 : is defensive he assumes the other side is out to damage him. We may call the players MaxMin or pessimistic.
A Noncooperative Equilibrium player or NEP assumes that she faces a player motivated like herself. This behavior can be described by two parallel maximizing equations 4 . We consider a pair of noncooperative players playing each other and also contrast their performance with three other pairs of player types playing four specially named games, We then consider all 144 games in aggregate and broken into four structural categories now noted.
We know that in the initial resource distribution we may break all 144 games into four natural categories Joint maximum Frequency  8  36  7  60  6  42  5  6  Table 1 Frequency of maximal wealth
The 36 games with a joint wealth of 8 each can be called 'Games of coordination'. There is a single cell with value (4; 4) that is a natural point of attraction.
The 6 games with joint maximum equal to 5 are games of pure opposition. There is no potential opportunity for individual gain from collaboration. The games with a joint maximum of 6 or 7 are mixed motive games where gains can be made by coordination and collaboration. We note that the modal wealth of the four types is 7:
E¢ ciency and behavior
The work presented here on all possible worlds is made under a considerable heap of assumptions with no comment on the trade-o¤s between e¢ ciency and symmetry. This problem is considered elsewhere. Furthermore we consider only 'pure populations'where agents are matched only against agents of the same type. Except for one illustrative example, players of di¤erent types being matched against each other are considered elsewhere [?], [12] . The mixed, more complex approach is congenial with evolutionary game theory [2] . 5 
Inference and pure believers
We carry out our evaluation for the pairs of four types on four speci…c named games that we call prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, battle of the sexes and best of all possible 2 2 worlds and then on all of the 144 games categorized into several segments as noted below. In doing so contrast between structure and behavior emerge as do contrasts among di¤erent structures and behaviors.
The …rst game is the prisoner's dilemma Table 3 We see immediately Maxmax Entropy Maxmin NCE. Thus do-gooders are …rst with 6, next random with 5; followed by the cautious and individualist with 4 in this structurally worst 2 2 world.
The second game is the stag hunt 1 2 1 4; 4 1; 3 2 3; 1 2; 2 Table 4  Stag hunt There is a coordination problem with the NCE for both the battle of the sexes and stag hunt. As they have two NCEs and the battle of the sexes has two JM as well, for each some form of tie-breaking rule is required. This is not a problem in pure logic. It requires an extra assumption. The di¢ culty can be avoided here by de…ning and considering three types of NCE players NCE 1 , NCE 2; and NCE 3; one for each equilibrium outcome and similarly JM 1 and JM 2 for di¤erent joint maxima. Reporting for the illustrative calculations both the higher and lower NCE we note We see immediately Individualist type 1 and idealists are tied at …rst, fools or entropic players are second and last are individualists type 2 and the cautious.
The third game is the battle of the sexes, again there is a problem with two PSNE 1 2 1 4; 3 1; 2 2 2; 1 3; 4 The e¢ ciency indices for the four games above appear to show In the best of all possible worlds structure guides all pairs of players to Optimality except for the fools.
In the PD or worst of all possible worlds the idealists do well (but it is knifeedged as noted below), the ignorant are next best and the 'rational'and cautious actors have the worst outcome. Structure goes against individualistic behavior.
When there is the possibility of more than one equilibrium the problems of coordination become critical. If all are behaviorally cooperative a convention is still needed for coordination We enlarge our evaluation for the combinations of four types of players matched against all types just for the PD game to show the new phenomena that appear with heterogeneous players 6 . Table 16 We see immediately the NCE versus ENT or JM or NCE or MinMax has an average yield of ((2 + 3 + 4 + 2) =4) = 11=4, ENT gives ((1:5 + 2:5 + 3:5 + 1:5) =4) = 9=4 , JM or MaxMax gives ((1 + 2 + 3 + 1) =4) = 7=4 and MinMax or cautious yields (2 + 2 + 4 + 2) = 10=4 . Thus sel…sh is …rst with 2:75, cautious next with 2:5; followed by random with 2:25 and do-gooders last with 1:75 in this structurally worst 2 2 world.
We note that depending on structure and the behavior of others, fools may gain or lose from the damage of their blunders Here the fools hurt themselves against realists or pessimists, but gain considerably if they play against idealists or do-gooders.
A note on viability and environment
The purpose of these tedious but simple calculations (at least to us) is to show both the gains and the dangers from going between the descriptive words and their simple mathematical representations. If not interpreted too literally they can show when fools hurt themselves more or less than they hurt others. They show where the idealists shine in the best of all possible worlds but can be taken advantage of otherwise. In even these few instances there appear to be examples of 'anything goes'. In the context of one period with no social learning the individualistic and the cautious (maxmin) behaviors appear as the most viable. In Section 3:2:3 and Appendix 1 we make this more precise over all 2 2 games.
The four games were structurally highly di¤erent and we could safely observe that the viability of the di¤erent agents varied with the environment, and we considered di¤erent types of agent matched against each other.
In our last set of comparisons we consider the whole set of 144 6 games that can be considered as societies with joint gain available
We limit ourselves to two crude measures. The …rst uses the ratio of the joint outcome achieved to the joint maximum that is feasible.
Index 1 = OU T COM E JM
The second uses as a basis a zero point of worst joint sum feasible and takes the ratio Index 2 = OU T COM E W ORST JM W ORST We do not dwell on the many index construction problems here 7 . We nevertheless make a case for crude estimates of the gap between di¤erent behaviors and an ideal collaboration. Appendix 1 gives the calculations for all 144 games for joint maximum, the best and worst noncooperative equilibria, the maxmin or pessimist players and the entropy players.
E¢ ciency Measures in All 2 2 games
The summary of the …nal calculations given in Appendix 1 are presented here broken into the four natural classes then breaking them into the three classes n = 8; 7; 6 and 5:
Games of coordination: n = 8
There are 36 games of coordination where each pair has the opportunity to select an outcome of (4; 4):
JM The structure o¤ers a natural signal for optimal coordination, but with Index 1 on the average the worst noncoperative equilibrium misses by 8%: The cautious leave 22% and the fools 37%.
The Index 2 is possibly more reasonable inasmuch as it is anchored on the gains above the worst outcome. On the average the worst noncooperative equilibrium misses by 17%: The cautious leave 44% and the fools 75%:
Mixed motive games 1: n = 7
There are 60 mixed motive games with n = 7: These are the modal structure.
JM The structure highlights the need for collaboration in face of no universal easy coordination in the structure. Index 1 on the average has the best noncooperative equilibrium miss by 8% the worst noncooperative equilibrium misses by 11%: The cautious leave 12% on the table and the fools 29%.
The Index 2 yields for the best noncooperative equilibrium a miss of 13% the average worst noncooperative equilibrium misses by 20%: The cautious leave 21% and the fools 49%:
Mixed motive games 2: n = 6
There are 42 mixed motive games with n = 6: They have less fat to …ght over than those previously noted.
JM Index 1 on the average has the best noncooperative equilibrium, the worst noncooperative equilibrium and the cautious all leave 7% on the table and the fools 17%:The Index 2 yields the same for best noncooperative equilibrium worst noncooperative equilibrium and the cautious all leave 15% and the fools 39%
Games of pure opposition: n = 5
There are only 6 mixed motive games with n = 5: They have a pure opposition of interests as is noted in Table 20 JM Table 20 Paradoxically the handful of constant sum games with a joint maximum of 5 have every outcome as Pareto optimal thus to include them in a measure primarily aimed at considering joint gains in a society is misleading. The intent operators NCE, MaxMax, Maxmin all collapse to yielding the same behavior in a two person Hobbsian constant sum world. The bounds on the average e¢ ciency of purely individualistic behavior appear to be between at least 14% and at most 18% with purely defensive behavior coming in close at 19%
All mixed motive games: Index 2

Fools matter
Looking over the various games and solutions damage done by the ignorant varies. We may regard all non learning purely syntactic players as being societally tone deaf.
The other players may or may not be concerned with how much the ignorant damage themselves, but it is easy to produce games where the fools damage others as well as themselves. The clever game theorist, can easily cook up examples where it pays the cunning to play the fool, but often fools are fools.
Being Nice matters in context
In various outcomes here always being intrinsically cooperative does not pay. When the structure is as the best of all possible worlds joint maximality is coaxed out of all syntactic,non-malicious player types modeled here.
In philosophical writings we have the realism and skepticism of Hobbes and Voltaire contrasting with the fuzzy-headedness mythology of the original perfect primitive world of the trendy salon speaker Rousseau. The more realistic view appears to be that of Hume where the social individual is cooperative but no fool. In order to start to do justice to such a player we would need at least two plays where learning can begin. It is here where a tit-for-tat player can be considered. The one ply does not permit ‡exibility but the two ply opens up a manageable set of minimal learning possibilities
Costs, Coordination and Cooperation
Civilization, culture, society and law move on broader and slower time scales than everyday life and almost all of the individual consumer and worker economic and political activities. We do not live in the utopian best of all possible worlds and do not live in purely dystopian structures. We have rich or not so rich mixed motive structures. The models of the noncooperative and cautious or pessimistic agents are metaphors for decentralized behavior. But the behavior is within the structure of the rules of the game. The departure from Optimality appears to range from a low of around 15 to 20% that can be considered as the potential gain available from coordination and cooperation.
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